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Abstract
Objective. The literature on indiscriminate violence has emphasized how information shapes
state capacity and determines whether and where the government employs collective targeting.
This article investigates the conditions that inuence the government's ability to obtain intelli-
gence in counterinsurgencies. Specically, it suggests that the government is more likely to use
indiscriminate violence in areas characterized by indigenous ethnic homogeneity and forested ter-
rain. These features increase the cost of acquiring information about the insurgents, and reduce
state capacity, thereby increasing the likelihood of indiscriminate violence. Method. We examine
district-level data on the Russian government's use of indiscriminate violence and disaggregated
data on ethnicity and terrain across the North Caucasus from 2000 to 2011. Results. The results
indicate that ethnically homogeneous and forested areas are signicantly more likely targets of
indiscriminate violence, and that the eect of ethnicity is markedly stronger when the district is
densely forested. Conclusion. This nding expands on previous studies by testing the observ-
able implications of theories linking information to indiscriminate violence, and by providing new
micro-level evidence for important human and physical constraints on counterinsurgencies.
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On December 29 and 30, 2013, unknown Islamic insurgents from the North Caucasus blew up a trolly-
bus and the main train station in Volgograd, Russia, killing about three dozen people. The attacks
were immediately linked to the Winter 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi (Souleimanov, 2014; Dzutsev,
2014), but were merely the most recent in a long-standing `sons of the soil' conict between the Kremlin
and the North Caucasus, where the Russian army has used its entire repertoire of conventional arms to
ght the insurgency for the past twenty years (Evangelista, 2002; Gammer, 2006; Souleimanov, 2007).
Needless to say, the consequences for civilians caught in the cross-re have been deadly (Cherkasov,
2001).
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The war has also been counterproductive, since it has hardened the divide between ethnic Rus-
sians and indigenous groups in the North Caucasus, and has expanded the scope of the problem,
spreading violence from Chechnya to other republics throughout the North Caucasus: Dagestan, In-
gushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and elsewhere. Numerous international human rights organization have
condemned Russia for its use of indiscriminate violence, including artillery and air strikes on populated
places, as well as for the use of extrajudicial killings (Bjorken, 2000; HRW, 2006; ICG, 2014). The
Russian government and its armed forces have repeatedly tried to subdue the insurgency, sometimes
selectively targeting individual leaders, but often indiscriminately and without apparent regard for
civilian causalities.1 One of Russia's tactics in Chechnya was a standardized barrage pattern known
as `harassment and interdiction' (H&I) that consists of barrages at random intervals and of varying
duration on random days without evidence of enemy movement (Lebedev, 1984, p. 373-75; Lyall, 2009,
p. 343).
Although scholars and strategists generally agree that selective violence is more eective than in-
discriminate violence|which forces non-combatants to ee into the arms of the rebels for security,
engenders new grievances, and creates public outrage|governments across the globe continue to por-
tray large swaths of civilians as insurgents and punish them without distinction. Given its serious
drawbacks, which have been amply documented (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 146-72), why and where do govern-
ments nonetheless deliberately use indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency warfare?
The literature provides us with several important insights, predictions and causal mechanisms. In
one of the rst rational choice treatments of this topic, Mason and Krane (1989) explain why low state
capacity could drive the government's use of indiscriminate violence.2 Kalyvas (2006) signicantly
expanded this line of research and generated new insights into how the scarcity of cooperative civil-
ian informants and the degree (or zone) of control shape the type of violence.3 Downes (2007) also
extends this research agenda by providing a logic of desperation that explains why governments use
indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgencies, and species the circumstances under which it can work
to quell insurgencies.4 In a recent study, Fjelde and Hultman (2013) provide evidence from Africa that
informational shortages cause ethnic groups to target each other indiscriminately as collectives.
These explanations, as well as others discussed later, help us to understand why rational actors may
use indiscriminate violence. In dierent ways and focusing on dierent actors, each of these accounts
implies that low state (or armed actor) capacity|as manifest in the government's diculty obtaining
intelligence, distinguishing ghters from civilians, maintaining control and avoiding desperation|plays
a key role in determining the use of indiscriminate violence. We build on these ndings and seek to
understand why civilian informants are more uncooperative, why information is more dicult to obtain
and why control is more elusive in some places than in others. These issues highlight some of the key
causal mechanisms and point to several observable implications.
For state capacity to be an explanation for the use of indiscriminate violence, however, it must be a
variable rather than a constant across space and time, and not only between states but perhaps more
importantly within them. Although a country may have a relatively high military capacity compared
to another country (e.g., Russia versus El Salvador or Somalia), state capacity varies within countries
as well, and is typically weakest near the periphery, where `ethnic others' reside in large numbers
(Cederman et al., 2009). Even within an insurgency-aected area in a peripheral region, the state's
capacity is highly variable and this variation is likely to inuence its counterinsurgency strategy and
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specically the probability of collectively targeting certain areas.
The literature provides good reasons to treat state capacity in counterinsurgency settings as variable
within a state. A state's capacity is not independent of location. To project force eectively and with
precision in a counterinsurgency operation, a state depends on intelligence about people and activities
in that area, which often requires cooperative informants. As scholars of counterinsurgency have noted,
the information civilians share with governmental forces is the indicator of how well the government is
faring in its counterinsurgency campaign (Condra and Shapiro, 2012). A core task for counterinsurgents
is obtaining reliable intelligence (Galula, 2006; Kitson, 1971; Thompson, 1966), since information scarce
environments reduce state capacity by \blinding" governments and forcing them to resort to collective
targeting and indiscriminate violence.
The ow of information from the civilian population to the government's forces in counterinsurgency
campaigns is shaped by many factors. This article emphasizes two structural constraints on the ow of
information that predispose certain areas to suer more indiscriminate violence from the government's
forces than other areas. Specically, it suggests that ethnic homogeneity and forested terrain are
likely to constrain the government's ability to obtain reliable intelligence through human and satellite
methods, and this in turn makes these areas signicantly more likely to suer from indiscriminate
violence.
The rest of the article develops this idea, and tests three observable implications using new micro-
level data. The rst section situates the argument within the literature on indiscriminate violence and
counterinsurgency warfare. The second section develops a theory to explain spatial variation in the
government's use of indiscriminate violence, and derives three testable hypotheses. The third section
describes new district-level data on the Russian government's use of indiscriminate violence across
the North Caucasus. The fourth section presents the methods and the empirical results. The last
section summarizes the article's core ndings regarding the structural sources of spatial variation in
the government's use of indiscriminate violence. It concludes with a discussion of how these results
may shed new light on why governments rationally use indiscriminate violence and collective targeting
in counterinsurgencies, and particularly on where such violence is most likely to occur.
Theorizing Indiscriminate Violence
Existing studies of violence and irregular war indicate that carefully targeted violence against insurgents
may be eective at quelling an insurgency, but that civilians turn to the rebels for protection once the
government reverts to indiscriminate violence because political inertness no longer guarantees their
safety (Mason and Krane, 1989). Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) also argue that civilians start to engage
in rebel activities in the face of indiscriminate violence because it is safer for them to side with the
insurgents than to remain neutral.5 Azam (2006) suggests that indiscriminate violence lowers the
reservation point and the marginal cost for joining the rebels. In short, indiscriminate violence is
thought to help the rebels more than the government by tipping the balance against free riding and
allowing rebels to more easily surmount the collective action problem. It provides civilians with a
reason to join the rebels, both to ensure the safety (Mason and Krane, 1989; Goodwin, 2001) and to
strike back and obtain `justice' (Wood, 2003, p. 18-19, Kalyvas, 2006, 151-160, Souleimanov, 2007,
p. 270-276). As Kalyvas and Kocher note (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007, p. 183): `individuals [may]
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participate in rebellion not in spite of the risk but in order to better manage it.' The result is often an
inecient spiral of violence (Zurcher, 2007, p. 113).
Although governments may be cognizant of the potentially negative consequences of adopting such
a strategy, increasing repression and indiscriminate violence may become the preferred strategy `not
because it has a high probability of success, but because the weakness of the state precludes its re-
sorting to less violent alternatives' (Mason and Krane, 1989, p. 175). In other words, states resort to
indiscriminate violence, the argument goes, not because they want but because they must (Zhukov,
2013).6 Several scholars note that the use of indiscriminate violence is a sign of weakness and despera-
tion (Downes, 2008; Hultman, 2007; Valentino et al., 2004). While state capacity explanations oer an
important angle on this problem, they have been criticized for tautological reasoning and lacking clear
causal mechanisms (Kocher, 2010). We agree that state capacity needs to be explained and correctly
specied according to context. It would be dicult to call Russia a weak state, yet it has been unable
to quell rebel violence in the Russian North Caucasus for more than two decades. An important reason,
which is suggested in Zhukov (2013), is that coercion is dicult when information is unavailable and
or costly to obtain. The central government in Russia realizes this problem, and has therefore opted
to use local agents to maintain control in the North Caucasus, such as Ramzan Kadyrov in Chechnya.
The region receives large nancial support from the central government that allows the regional rulers
to maintain political order in accordance with the wishes of the government in Moscow. However,
this solution does not resolve the dilemma of instilling the desired order, because indirect rule is a
double-edged sword that creates a principal-agent problem (Gerring et al., 2011; Gortzak and Siroky,
2012; Hechter, 2000; Salehyan et al., 2012). Moscow is rightly wary of devolving political power to its
regional agents that it cannot fully control. Regional agents are often unable or unwilling to follow
orders from the central government. This explains the widespread practice of dispatching large police
forces from other regions of Russia to the North Caucasian republics. Local police forces are deemed
too unreliable to be trusted with certain responsibilities, even though they are generously paid by the
government in Moscow.
Applied to our theory, more (non-Russian) ethnic homogeneity implies more solidarity, all else equal,
and this increase the cost of intelligence to the government, even when the center can delegate some of
its informational collection eorts to locals. Lyall and Wilson (2009) also show that the mechanization
of modern militaries inhibits information collection among local populations and results in increased
diculties for the government to separate insurgents from noncombatants and selectively apply rewards
and punishment. Condra and Shapiro (2012) also make arguments that support this approach, and
suggest that the information civilians share with government forces is the indicator of how well the
government is faring in its counterinsurgency campaign. This paper emphasizes two factors{one human
( ethnic homogeneity) and one physical (forested terrain){which are highly variable across space within
the same conict, and jointly inuence the availability of information that permits the government to
adopt more selective counterinsurgency strategies.
To explain why and how the availability of this information is shaped by local human and physical
structures, we rst discuss the role of ethnicity and then the role of forested terrain, and nally how
they interact to inuence the likelihood of an area being indiscriminately targeted.
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From Ethnicity to Information and Indiscriminate Violence
It is well known that organized state violence can harden group identities and shape behavior (Balcells,
2012; Simmel, 1955). Thus, while ethnic solidarity might antedate the conict, it can also be constructed
out of the conict, creating an endogeneity issue. However, some degree of ethnic concentration appears
to be necessary for resolving the initial collective action problem, and relatively spatially concentrated,
ethnically homogeneous areas have a clear comparative advantage in this regard (Toft, 2010; Weidmann,
2009). The current conict in Eastern Ukraine, for instance, is likely to harden the ethnic identities of
Ukrainians and Russians, but it is not by accident that the conict started in those areas where ethnic
Russians were concentrated (e.g., the Donetsk and Luhansk regions). In the Caucasus, where many
ethnic groups hold a grudge against the central Russian state, the conict also took hold initially in
Chechnya, where there was the largest and most spatially concentrated indigenous ethnic group in the
North Caucasus (among those groups with grievances).7
Prior research indicates that group solidarity tends to be higher where administrative and ethnic
boundaries are coterminous{i.e., when a local administrative unit is ethnically homogeneous (Homans,
1950; McPherson and Smith-Lovin, 1987; Hechter, 1988, 2000; Roeder, 2007; Siroky and Cue, 2015).8
Locally homogeneous populations can foster higher levels of group solidarity because they can more
eciently monitor in-group members than ethnically divided districts, and thus punishment for trea-
sonous behavior can be meted out with more precision (Hechter, 1988). In-group solidarity regulates
and stems the ow of information from the insurgents to the government. When the central government
nds it dicult to ip locals and recruit reliable informants, it is more likely to become desperate and
to adopt a counterinsurgency strategy with diminished precision. These dynamics are self-reinforcing,
since unintentional civilian casualties tend to further reduce cooperation from civilians (Thier and Ran-
jbar, 2009; Condra and Shapiro, 2012). Ethnic structures are therefore crucial in counterinsurgencies
because highly solidaristic groups are dicult to penetrate, which makes intelligence hard to obtain
and reduces the state's capacity to target insurgents more selectively.
Local ethno-demographic structures condition how easily the government will be able to nd reliable
civilian informants willing to risk punishment (usually death) at the hands of members of their own
group for defection and collaboration (Kalyvas, 2008; Staniland, 2012). As a result, governments are
likely to possess fewer options for extracting reliable and accurate information in ethnically homoge-
neous areas. The lack of reliable and accurate information diminishes the state's capacity and makes
governments desperate, which increases the likelihood of electing to deliberately target civilians. State
capacity is thus not a constant, even within the same country and time period, but is endogenous
to local ethnic solidarity, which inuences the extent to which information is leaked or quarantined.
Where information is contained, the government possesses lower state capacity and is more likely to
use indiscriminate violence against civilians.
Ethnic homogeneity provides the insurgents with key advantages that help it to overcome problems
of information leakage and collaboration. Areas with greater ethnic diversity lack the same strength
of monitoring, punishment and reciprocity mechanisms (Fehr et al., 1997; Gintis, 2000; Collier, 2001;
Habyarimana et al., 2007). Although there is a large body of literature on how, and if so how much,
ethnic heterogeneity is associated with a greater likelihood of civil war at the cross-national level
(Sambanis, 2006), the sub-national level (Cunningham and Weidmann, 2010), and with more intense
ethnic wars (Lacina, 2006), the link between ethnic structure and the use of indiscriminate violence
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has received relatively little attention.9
Ethnicity need not be conceptualized in primordial terms, and multiple identities may exist, which
may be more or less uid, in this theory. Indeed, ethnic defection is still possible because ethnic
solidarity is variable. Nonetheless, regardless of how uid and myriad identities may be at a conceptual
level, ethnic defection and information extraction should prove more dicult in areas dominated by one
ethnic group with a high level of group solidarity. Moreover, since a decrease in economic development
often precedes and accompanies counterinsurgency campaigns, the local population is often forced to
increase its reliance on ethnic and clan structures for the provision of their needs in order to access
public goods and services.10
Since the availability of information and access to cooperative informants in ethnically homogeneous
areas depends almost by denition on the government's ability to seize upon potential ethnic defectors,
the government must be willing and able to provide incentives to the defectors willing to engage in
violence against their own ethnic kin (Kalyvas, 2008; Staniland, 2012).11 Whereas Kalyvas focuses
on the supply side of ethnic defection, Staniland emphasizes the demand side. This article builds
on both these logics, and also highlights the conditions under which it is less or more likely. An
important qualication to the demand side of ethnic defection is that switching to the government's
side may be just as precarious as remaining in the insurgency. Consider the current ruler of Chechnya,
Ramzan Kadyrov. Along with his father Ahmad Kadyrov, he defected to the government's side in the
second Russian-Chechen war. In the rst Russian-Chechen war, 1994-1996, both father and son fought
the Russians. Soon after coming to power, Ramzan Kadyrov started to systematically eliminate high
prole competitors to his patronage from the Kremlin. For example, Ruslan and Sulim Yamadaev, both
\Heroes of Russia", switched sides from the rebel forces to pro-Russian forces but were killed, most
likely on Kadyrov's orders. Ruslan Yamadaev was gunned down in Moscow12 and Sulim Yamadaev
was assassinated in Dubai (UAE).13
On the supply side, the government's willingness to accommodate the insurgents is constrained
by principal-agent problems that arise when the government rules indirectly through native leaders
(Hechter, 2000; Gerring et al., 2011). The central government succeeds in splitting the insurgency
by co-opting some of the insurgents and elevating a few of them to positions of power. The ip
side of this shrewd move is the government's loss of control, which can potentially undermine the
entire eort to regain control over the region. This is precisely what has happened in Chechnya. The
Russian government has avoided replicating the Chechen model of indirect rule elsewhere in the North
Caucasus where the insurgency has spread, and for good reasons, even though there is evidence of
demand for more self-rule (Siroky et al., 2013). The government may be willing to pay the price of
using indiscriminate violence, instead of providing overly generous incentives for ethnic defection, when
the aected area is ethnically homogenous and principal-agent problems, especially moral hazard, are
likely to be severe.14
In focusing on the role of ethnicity, we are not arguing that ethnicity per se explains violence and we
recognize that many political, social and economic factors inuence the likelihood that the government
will use indiscriminate violence. All else equal, local ethnic structures have a strong inuence on the ow
of information from local insurgency cells to the government because, in ethnically homogenous areas,
intra-group dependence is generally high, free riding options are limited, and cooperative informants are
few. This scarcity of information shapes state capacity at the local level, and in this way probabilistically
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inuences the government's counterinsurgency strategy. If this argument is correct, the observable
empirical implication should be a concentration of indiscriminate violence in ethnically homogeneous
districts.
If this is what the evidence reveals, this result would be consistent with the results in Cunningham
and Weidmann (2010), which nds that conict between an ethnic group and the state is more likely
in locations that contain one demographically dominant ethnic group. A key mechanism for this is
highlighted in Hechter (1988), which argues that groups are created to produce club goods and persist
through their ability to engage in eective monitoring and sanctioning that are facilitated by depen-
dence on the group. Monitoring and sanctioning are easier to implement in ethnically homogeneous
communities, where group solidarity is generally higher and recruitment is easier (Gintis, 2000; Collier,
2001; Varughese and Ostrom, 2001; Habyarimana et al., 2007). When the government reverts to indis-
criminate actions, personal safety becomes one of the most valuable goods that groups can produce.
The production of this good enhances group solidarity and increases barriers to entry and external
penetration. A central component of the barrier is informational. Ethnic homogeneity makes it more
dicult for the government to obtain reliable information, which pushes the government to engage
in more indiscriminate actions and results in a concentration of indiscriminate violence in ethnically
homogeneous districts. Mixed populations make it easier for the government to extract intelligence by
exploiting ethnic rivalries, and reduce the insurgency's ability to quarantine information and maintain
a cohesive resistance.
From Terrain to Information and Indiscriminate Violence
The second micro-level factor emphasized in this paper that shapes the government's strategy is the
physical terrain. Collier (2000), Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Kalyvas et al. (2008) all point to the
role of dicult to traverse terrain on civil war and armed rebellion. Counterinsurgency theorists
have long recognized that environmental structures inuence the dynamics of conict in crucial ways
(Galula, 2006). \Guerrilla ghting," wrote Che Guevara, \will not always take place in the country
most favorable to the employment of its tactics; but when it does, that is, when the guerrilla band is
located in zones dicult to reach, either because of dense forests, steep mountains, impassable deserts
or marshes, the general tactics, based on the fundamental postulates of guerrilla warfare, must always
be the same."15 Laqueur (1975) even argues that guerrilla warfare is dened by the use of dicult to
traverse terrain. Both Buhaug and Gates (2002) and Fearon and Laitin (1999, 2003) nd evidence that
countries with more mountainous terrain were more likely to experience civil wars. Since rebel forces are
normally in a weaker position than the government, they need to nd ways to tip the balance of forces
in their favor, and to survive they need places to hide. Dicult terrain provides such opportunities by
oering refuge for insurgents and preventing the government from putting their superior forces to more
eective use (Glaser and Kaufmann, 1998; Esteban et al., 2012; Carter and Veale, 2013).
Most of the literature identies rough terrain as conferring tactical advantages and refuge or safe
havens to the rebels. In addition, Hendrix (2011) argues, dicult terrain deprives the state of the ability
to build an eective tax system and thereby decreases the state's scal capacity. Benson and Kugler
(1998) nds that `relative extractive capacity' is negatively associated with the severity of conict{that
is, countries are less likely to experience intense civil wars when they are able to better access the
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resources of the societies they govern. Just as rough terrain and remote territory reduces the ability
of the state to generate revenue by increasing the costs associated with collection, which generates
lower scal contracts, this diminished revenue weakens the state's ability to contain and address other
problems in its periphery, especially insurgency.
Hendrix (2011) posits that there is an indirect eect of mountainous terrain on tax capacity and a
direct eect of mountainous terrain and tax capacity on civil war onset. The eect of geography on
conict is thus mediated by state capacity. This is consistent with Thies (2010), which nds that several
measures of state extractive capacity are statistically unrelated to civil war onset using a simultaneous
equations model. When focusing on the government's use of indiscriminate violence within an existing
civil war (rather than on civil war onset), we expect that dicult terrain should make it less likely
that the government employs selective targeting. While terrain has numerous eects, and it certainly
confers tactical advantages to the rebels, the primary mechanism emphasized in this article concerns how
terrain{particularly forested terrain{undermines the state's capacity to conduct surveillance and gather
intelligence. Satellite and other digital intelligence are harder to exploit in forested areas, which also
typically lack of important infrastructure, such as roads that are useful for surveying and controlling
the insurgents. Moreover, when satellite intelligence and other distance-monitoring mechanisms are
made more dicult, the government must rely more on human intelligence.
However, human intelligence is more costly to obtain in areas characterized by ethnically homogene-
ity of the out-group, which brings us to the central argument in this paper{namely, that terrain and
ethnic homogeneity are mutually reinforcing because both make it more costly for the central govern-
ment (for human and physical reasons) to collect taxes, extract intelligence and identify insurgents for
selective targeting. The rst two hypothesis examine the unconditional eects of terrain and ethnic
homogeneity, whereas the third (and primary) conjecture concerns how the eect of ethnic homogeneity
on indiscriminate violence is enhanced by the presence of forested terrain.
Deriving Testable Hypotheses
Given the diculty that ethnic homogeneity can pose to the ability of a government ghting a coun-
terinsurgency to nd cooperative informants and acquire reliable intelligence, it is hardly surprising that
diluting pockets of ethnic homogeneity is a strategy that governments have routinely pursued through-
out history and around the world in the periphery{from Xinjiang and Javakheti to Ireland. Indeed, this
form of divide and rule by mixing populations has been around since the time of Nebuchadnezzar, if
not earlier, and was a key component in the formation of early modern Europe (Bartlett, 1994). More
recently, Zhukov (2014) explored mass forcible resettlements in the Soviet Union, and emphasized the
role of imperfect information in the government's decision to use mass resettlement as a policy tool. In
examining the problem of collective targeting and indiscriminate violence, we build on these arguments
by positing that where there is a greater degree of ethnic homogeneity (and thus a scarcity of action-
able intelligence), the government is more likely to use indiscriminate violence, including such drastic
measures as mass population transfers and indiscriminate shelling. This leads to the rst hypothesis.16
Hypothesis 1: Ethnically homogeneous districts are more likely to be subject to a greater amount
of indiscriminate governmental violence.
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The second micro-level factor we theorize is terrain{specically, the role that forested terrain plays
in shaping the government's counterinsurgency strategy. While certain kinds of terrain are thought to
make insurgency more likely in the rst place by confering tactical advantages to the rebels (Fearon and
Laitin, 2003; Esteban et al., 2012),17 the hypothesized mechanism here is that forested terrain shapes the
cost of surveillance and limits the utility of non-human (e.g. satellite) intelligence gathering. Like eth-
nic homogeneity, forested prevents the government from obtaining reliable and accurate information at
a reasonable cost, which makes it harder to use precision measures. This leads to the second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Districts with more forested terrain are likely to be subject to more indiscriminate
governmental violence.
An alternative explanation for the relationship between forested terrain and indiscriminate govern-
mental violence is that using artillery shelling and air raids would cause many casualties and would
destroy a lot of buildings in cities, but not in a forest. If the state does not expect that civilians and their
property are located near the target, it has less incentive to avoid using indiscriminate violence. This
explanation omits two crucial considerations, however. First, the government's need to use artillery
and other means of indiscriminate violence already signies the state's failure to quell the insurgency
through alternative means. Second, the state's reliance on highly visible means of destruction indicates
its lack of local control.
When both human and physical means of intelligence gathering are constrained, the government
will be forced to resort to indiscriminate tactics. The third and nal hypothesis therefore posits an
interactive eect between ethnic homogeneity and forested terrain.
Hypothesis 3: The eect of ethnic homogeneity on indiscriminate violence is enhanced by the pres-
ence of densely forested terrain.
In the next section, we describe disaggregated district-level data on all the factors implied by these
hypotheses and covering the Russian counterinsurgency across the North Caucasus from 2000-2011.
Data Description
While it is widely known that the central government in Moscow fought two Russian-Chechen wars in
1994-1996 and 1999-2000, a protracted low scale insurgency has continued to spread across the North
Caucasus region. In 2010-2012, an average of about 700 people have died in insurgency-related attacks
in the North Caucasus every year. The vast majority of attacks have taken place in four autonomous
republics in the North Caucasus{Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria{but other
nearby territories have also been hit occasionally.18 Within these regions, there are many ethnic groups,
some spatially concentrated into homogeneous enclaves and others spatially dispersed, and there is a
wide variety of terrain as well, ranging from densely forested villages to open plains. This presents us
with an excellent opportunity to explore the three hypothesized relationships.19
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The dependent variable is operationalized as the count of violent indiscriminate acts in a given
district, pooled over the period 2000 and 2011. Municipal districts include rural districts, cities and
combinations of cities with adjacent rural areas. An indiscriminate act includes any incident involving
artillery shelling, air raids, or the use of armored vehicles, and taken by the Russian Army, the FSB
(Russian Federal Security Service), Special Forces, Police Forces, the Federal Administration, the Local
Administration, and Ramzan Kadyrov.20 Since our primary hypotheses are structural and spatial rather
than temporal, we pool all the observations over time by district. The dataset builds on a unique data
collection eort that uses a dictionary-based automated event coding to identify news reports about
armed attacks, involving rebels and government forces (Zhukov, 2012). We expanded these data to
include new district-level data to test the main hypotheses.
Figure I depicts the spatial distribution of indiscriminate government violence, the proportion of the
largest indigenous ethnic group and the proportion of forested area across the North Caucasus in the
region's 200 districts.21
[Figure I about here.]
To examine the role that ethnic structure may play in determining where the government is more
likely to use indiscriminate violence, we collected data from the Russian census on the ethnic compo-
sition of each district.22 We then calculated several formulas intended to capture the ethnic structure
of a location. The simplest one, which we ultimately adopt in our analysis as the most straightforward
indicator of our theoretical prediction, is the proportion of the largest indigenous ethnic group. To
test the eect of forested terrain, we measured the proportion of the village(s) with forested terrain
(Zhukov, 2013). We also included several controls, including measures for the proportion of villages
in a district located on petroleum reserves, the average population size of a district taken from two
censuses in 2002 and 2010, the average elevation of villages and towns above sea level in each district,
and the district's urbanization.23
Empirical Analysis and Discussion
To examine the hypothesized relationships, we estimated a series of negative binomial regression models
(Table I). Consistent with the rst hypothesis, we nd that as the proportion of the largest indigenous
ethnic group increases, the expected count of actions involving indiscriminate violence also increases.
The results indicate consistently high levels of statistical signicance across all model specications.24
Hypothesis 2 receives weaker empirical support, but the results do suggest that the government is
more likely to use indiscriminate violence in densely forested districts. This eect is hypothesized to
be important mainly in the presence of ethnic homogeneity, according to Hypothesis 3, and we nd
strong evidence for an interactive eect between forested terrain and ethnic homogeneity. This is
consistent with the third hypothesis, and suggest that districts that are both ethnically homogeneous
and densely forested - which implies that both human and physical constraints on intelligence gathering
are operating - are the most likely targets of indiscriminate violence.
Elevation is positively related to the government's use of indiscriminate violence in Model 2, but it
becomes less signicant in other models. Why is high elevation less robust of a predictor of indiscrimi-
nate governmental violence than forested terrain? One potential explanation is that since this variable
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simply measures the elevation of the district above the sea level, it may not capture the idea of dicult
to traverse terrain, since the government forces may still be able to easily access and control districts
with high elevation. Another reason is that there are simply fewer people living in higher elevation
districts than in forested area districts. This essentially means that dicult to traverse terrain does not
attract indiscriminate violence by itself, unless there is a substantial supply of people there willing to
rebel. The dierence between forested and mountainous terrains in the North Caucasus also points to a
possibility that these two factors may play dierent roles in dierent geographical locations, depending
on the pattern of population distributions.
The constitutive terms that are used to construct the interaction term (in this case, the ratio of
the largest ethnic group and the ratio of forested area) provide an estimate of the eect of ethnic
homogeneity and forest terrain on the dependent variable, if the other constitutive term is held at
zero (Brambor et al., 2006). What we notice is that when the variable `Forest' is held at zero, the
variable `Ethnicity' is still positive and statistically signicant. When `Ethnicity' is held at zero,
however, `Forest' is no longer statistically signicant. This makes sense, since districts where the
proportion of forested area is high, but the proportion of indigenous ethnic group is close to zero,
are mainly ethnic Russian villages and districts. Ethnic Russians in the North Caucasus are not
engaged in an armed conict with the central government in Moscow, so districts with high values
for forested terrain and low values for indigenous ethnic homogeneity are far less likely to attract the
government's indiscriminate violence. In sum, the evidence strongly indicates that districts with high
levels of indigenous homogeneity and forested terrain are several times more likely to be targets of
indiscriminate violence.
[Table I about here.]
In order to explore these eects graphically, we constructed 2-d marginal eect plots and 3-d wire-
frame and contour plots. Figure II shows the marginal eect of the proportion of the largest indigenous
ethnic group on indiscriminate government violence (top panel). The eect of ethnicity starts to have
an impact approximately at the moment when it crosses 20% of the total population. The slope of
the marginal eect plot shows that the expected count of government indiscriminate actions doubles
approximately every 25% in the proportion of ethnic homogeneity in the district. The bottom panel
of Figure II shows the marginal eect of the proportion of the forested terrain in a given district. The
eect of forest begins at the low value of 5%, which already increases the expected count of indis-
criminate acts roughly 2.5 times. The slope of ethnicity is steeper than the slope of forested terrain
(e.g., the proportion of forested terrain would need to increase by 40% in order to double the count of
indiscriminate actions).
[Figure II about here.]
Figure III provide a 3-d representation of the interaction between indigenous ethnic homogeneity
and forested terrain using a wireframe plot. It displays the marginal eect of ethnicity and terrain
on the two horizontal axes and the interaction eect as a three-dimensional surface on the vertical
axis. Figure IV shows the eect of each of these factors for xed values of the other, e.g., the eect of
ethnicity when forested terrain is xed at a low level (5th percentile) and high level (95th percentile).
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It shows a signicant dierence in slopes. When the value of forested terrain is low, the expected
count of government indiscriminate violent actions grows by approximately 1.5 incidents for every 5%
growth in proportion of the largest indigenous ethnic group. When the value of forested terrain is high,
the expected count of government indiscriminate actions grows by 4 incidents for every 5% growth of
ethnic homogeneity. The bottom panel shows the reverse{the eect of forest for xed levels of ethnic
homogeneity. When the proportion of the largest indigenous ethnic group is low, the expected count
of government indiscriminate actions grows by approximately 0.7 incidents for every 5% growth in
proportion of the forested area. When ethnic homogeneity is high, the expected count of government
actions grows by nearly 3 incidents for every 5% growth in forested terrain. Figure V shows a contour
plot of the interaction eect, and illustrates how forested terrain signicantly enhances the eect of
ethnic homogeneity on indiscriminate violence.
[Figure III about here.]
[Figure IV about here.]
[Figure V about here.]
Finally, to examine the robustness of these results, we also estimated a hurdle model, a Zero-Inated
Negative Binomial model and a Zero-Inated Poisson model. However, a Vuong test indicated that
the Negative Binomial model and Zero-Inated Negative Binomial model were virtually the same, and
both consistently outperformed the Zero-Inated Poisson regression models. As a additional robustness
check, we therefore estimated the full model (Model 9 in Table I) using a Bayesian negative binomial
model and provide the posterior density and credible intervals for parameters.25 Table II shows the
results of the analysis. Figure VI shows the posterior density plots for the key variables, and indicates
that the interaction eect is a signicant and positive predictor of indiscriminate violence. Figure
VII shows an interval plot of the posterior parameter values using 95% credible intervals. These
Bayesian Negative Binomial results further reinforce the frequentist Negative Binomial estimates shown
in the Table I. Both the proportion of the largest indigenous ethnic group and its interaction with
the proportion of forested terrain display positive and statistically signicant relationships with the
government's propensity to engage in indiscriminate violence during counterinsurgency campaigns.
[Table II about here.]
[Figure VI about here.]
[Figure VII about here.]
While the North Caucasus is arguably the region with highest levels of ethnic diversity in the Rus-
sian Federation, we nd that indiscriminate violence within the region is disproportionately located
in ethnically homogeneous districts, especially those that are also densely forested, because the gov-
ernment has more diculty penetrating such districts, nding cooperative informants and acquiring
the necessary intelligence for selective targeting of insurgents. In other words, state capacity in these
locations is low. Low tax revenues serve both as an indicator of low state capacity in the region and
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simultaneously reinforce it.26 Ethnically tight communities tend to possess high levels of group soli-
darity and oer fewer cooperative informants, generating an information scarce environment for the
counterinsurgency, which forces the government to engage in more indiscriminate actions, even when
it is keenly aware that these may prove counterproductive. The dicult terrain in the North Caucasus
also hinders the central government's eorts to nd actionable intelligence and to extract taxes, which
renders the central state weaker and further enhances the eect of ethnic homogeneity on the use of
indiscriminate violence.
Conclusion
This article set out to investigate the sources of spatial variation in the government's use of indiscrimi-
nate violence. It develops an information-based theory and derives three testable hypothesis that could
explain variation in the government's use of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency warfare. The
evidence is consistent with the argument that ethnically homogeneous districts oer fewer cooperative
informants and less reliable intelligence, which forces the government to resort to more indiscriminate
tactics. Environmental factors, such as forested terrain, further constrain intelligence collection. Using
new disaggregated data on indiscriminate violence, ethnic structure and terrain in Russia's North Cau-
casus region, we nd that the government is most likely to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency tactics
in ethnically homogeneous and densely forested areas. The principal logic we propose emphasizes the
role of information, which is consistent with other arguments proposed in the literature, but expands
on this by showing that information is endogenous to local ethnic and environmental structures.
While we believe this study represents an important contribution to the eld, we also wish to
acknowledge several limitations. The rst is empirical: we analyze news reports about violent events,
which may introduce some bias because it is inherently dicult for journalists to gather accurate
and reliable information about conict zones. This is a problem that is unfortunately endemic to
conict studies that rely upon news reports. On the other hand, indiscriminate acts like air raids
are often hard to miss and harder to cover up from journalists, so it seems likely that many if not
most events have been captured in the data. Expert survey codings do not suer from this bias, but
must confront other sources of measurement error and expert prejudice. Since the objective was to
test a set of three theoretically motivated hypotheses using highly disaggregated data on violence,
social structure and the natural environment, this article has not engaged in detailed process tracing
of exactly how governments decide when and where to use indiscriminate counterinsurgency tactics,
and how noncombatants decide when and how much to support the insurgents. More work in this
area is needed to provide more depth to the proposed causal mechanisms and to unpack some of the
interactions identied. While we present some anecdotes, rich case studies are needed to delve deeper
into these processes. Finally, data limitations also circumscribe our analysis to the period 2000-2011.
We suspect that our arguments may apply to the earlier and subsequent eras as well, but we are unable
to test this conjecture at this time.
We conclude by noting that local ethnic structure and terrain jointly shape counterinsurgency strate-
gies by inuencing the availability and cost of information to the government. On this basis, we have
shown that areas characterized by more indigenous ethnic homogeneity and forested terrain are more
likely to be targets of indiscriminate violence. The results also show that the eect of ethnic homo-
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geneity is enhanced by the presence of densely forested terrain. As recent examples in Libya, Egypt,
Afghanistan, and Syria illustrate, indiscriminate violence is fundamentally inuenced by the govern-
ment's ability to penetrate local ethnic structures, to encourage ethnic defection and to exploit satellite
intelligence and digital surveillance. These opportunities are rare in areas dominated by a single native
ethnic group, and even more under dense forest cover. Identifying the micro-determinants of hotspots
for indiscriminate violence is an important goal that can enrich our theories of the dynamics of violence
in civil wars, but it is just a rst step toward mitigating its occurrence and protecting civilians from
deadly collective targeting.
Notes
1We dene indiscriminate violence consistent with recent studies (Lyall, 2009, p. 358), as `the collective targeting of
a population without credible eorts to distinguish between combatants and civilians. This denition assumes that the
nature of violence (selective or indiscriminate) is independent of the scale of the state's violence.'
2Their case study of El Salvador shows that indiscriminate violence is most likely in regimes without the institutional
machinery, economic resources or political will to address opposition challenges through more selective or accommodative
policies.
3In a study of guerrilla warfare in the Greek civil war, Kalyvas focuses on how violence is used to exert control and
gain collaborators, especially in areas where one side is locally dominant, but is losing control to the enemy{i.e., where
state capacity is on the decline.
4Downes also shows that democracies are no less likely to utilize indiscriminate violence. He provides supportive
evidence using a study of British behavior in the Boer insurgency in South Africa, and in colonial wars in Cuba, the
Philippines and Libya. In interstate wars of conquest, Downes argues that indiscriminate violence is used to eliminate
unwanted populations from conquered territory. Also see Valentino (2000) and Valentino et al. (2004).
5Kocher and Kalyvas provide unique evidence of this dynamic from the U.S. Phoenix program during the Vietnam
war.
6For evidence that the government's use of indiscriminate violence can stem an insurgency by revealing that `the
insurgency cannot credibly protect the population or respond in kind, feeding the perception that the insurgency is both
likely to lose and is endangering locals without bringing tangible benets.'...and therefore that `indiscriminate violence's
eects are suppressive, rather than escalatory, in nature', see Lyall (2009), p. 338.
7The reason why the conict did not initially spread to other areas of the region that held a grudge against Moscow,
however, was no doubt partly due to Moscow's response to Chechnya's quest for independence{neighboring Caucasian
nations updated their beliefs about the probability of success.
8This paper uses ethnic homogeneity as a proxy for local in-group solidarity, but other measures might be used if data
were available. In-group solidarity tends to be lower in areas marked by high rates of intermarriage and intermixing,
so district level measures of endogamy and spatial segregation would have been ideal, but such data were unfortunately
unavailable.
9(Fjelde and Hultman, 2013, p.2) is a recent exception, which studies communal conicts between ethnic groups
(rather than conicts between the state and an insurgency) and argues that \ethnicity [in Africa] provides a criterion for
collective targeting when individual wartime aliations are not known."
10One of the most violent regions in the North Caucasus, Dagestan has also the highest number of invalids that receive
support from the government. Zakir Magomedov, Nash Jihad - Korruptsiya, Ili Otkuda V Dagstane Stolko Invalidov (Our
Jihad is Corruption, OrWhy There Are So Many Invalids in Dagestan). http://www.echo.msk.ru/blog/publicpost/996210-
echo/
11(Kalyvas, 2008, p.1045) dened ethnic defection as `a process whereby individuals join organizations explicitly op-
posed to the national aspirations of the ethnic group with which they identify and end up ghting against their coethnics.'
12http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2008/09/24_a_2842014.shtml
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13http://ria.ru/trend/attempt_sulim_yamadaev_30032009/. Also see: http://www.interfax.ru/russia/txt.
asp?id=71695. The Russian government co-opted father Ahmad Kadyrov and his son, Ramzan Kadyrov, as the pro-
Russian rulers of Chechnya in 1999. The Russian government beneted from a split within the pro-independence Chechen
movement as the grand mufti of pro-independence Chechnya, Ahmad Kadyrov was red from his position by the pro-
independence Chechen government and declared an `enemy of the Chechen people' (See http://kadirov.ru/node/88). It
is plausible that the split in the insurgency preceded the government's plans for receiving ethnic defectors, consistent
with the logic in Staniland (2012).
14If the government is willing to pay the price of using indiscriminate violence, why should it be constrained by anything
at all? One might suggest that an ethnically Russian central government is unconcerned about collateral damage during
counterinsurgency campaigns in ethnically non-Russian regions. Russia's use of indirect rule in Chechnya, rather than
more indiscriminate violence, indicates that the central government still prefers to resolve the conict through less violent
means, by delegating power to the local Chechens, even if it has less concern for natives than for Russians in the region.
The central government in Russia also cracked down on independent media at the same as it cracked down in the
insurgency, allowing Putin to control the media's reporting on the counterinsurgency. The most notorious example is
the takeover of the independent TV channel, NTV, from its owner, Russian oligarch Vladimir Gusinsky, who was briey
detained in 2000, but managed eventually to leave the country.
15(Guevara, 1997, p.63), cited in Hendrix (2011)
16It is key that this is measured at the district level. The Russian Federation has a relatively low ethnic fractionalization
score, since nearly 80% of its population are ethnic Russians, but like many countries it has a highly variable ethnic
structure at the local level.
17However, Esteban et al. (2012) and Collier and Hoeer (2004) did not nd evidence for the eect of terrain variables.
18Caucasian Knot website, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/239836/.
19Russian State Statistical Service, 2010 census results, found at http://www.gks.ru. The Russian Federation as a
whole is relatively homogeneous in ethnic terms{about 80% of its population is ethnically Russian. At the same time,
the Republic of Dagestan in the Russian North Caucasus is ethnically very diverse with the largest ethnic group amounting
only to around 30% of the republic; the second largest group comprises 17%, the third ethnic group in line makes up
15%, and the fourth group 13%. When we examine detailed data on the district level in Dagestan, however, we see
that out of 52 administrative units, about half (24) have a single dominant ethnic group that comprises over 90% of
the administrative unit's population. It is in these homogeneous districts where we would expect the government to use
the most indiscriminate violence because they operate in an information poor environment in which the ability to target
selectively is diminished.
20This is our operational denition. For our conceptual denition, see note 1. One possible criticism of our opera-
tionalization of the dependent variable is that the use of artillery, air raids and other sophisticated weaponry does not
reect `low' state capacity. Indeed, the Russian government has been known to use highly sophisticated weapon systems
against insurgents in the North Caucasus. This in fact supports the paper's claim because when the government has to
resort to weapon systems, artillery and air raids that inict indiscriminate damage, even if these systems are of the latest
generation, the government has failed to selectively target the insurgents and to contain the rebellion at an early stage
when massive military machinery was not needed.
21These districts are nested within 9 regions (republics): Adygea, Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria,
Karachaevo-Cherkessia, Krasnodar region, North Ossetia and Stavropol region. Indiscriminate government violence was
logged for this gure to improve the visibility of its distribution across districts. Adygea and Krasnodar are excluded
from this gure because the shape le including these two regions is not currently available, but these two regions are
included in the empirical analysis.
22The data on the ethnic composition of districts in 2002 is drawn from an online project that maps ethnicity in the
Caucasus, http://www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru. Additional data on ethnic composition were drawn from O'Loughlin and
Witmer (2012).
23Urbanization is measured on a four point ordinal scale that ranges from entirely rural districts, rural districts with
cities as administrative centers, districts with only cities, and capitals with some adjacent rural settlements.
24The reason for focusing on the indigenous population of the region, instead of the largest ethnic group, is because
the largest group is some districts is Russian rather than native and our argument is about the dynamics in a `sons of
the soil' conict. Our measure is therefore a better measure of the key cleavage in the region, which is characterized
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by a sharp ethnic division between the central government, associated with Russian ethnicity, and the North Caucasus,
populated largely by native groups.
25We used R package bayesm (Rossi., 2012) for estimation of a Negative Binomial Bayesian model with a weak prior
of  = 0. We had to log the population variable to allow for the model's convergence.
26Samye Rastochitelnye: Minn raskritikoval Severny Kavkaz za Dorogie Avtomobili i Nizkuyu Sobiraemost Nalogov
[The Most Wasteful: Ministry of Finance Criticized the North Caucasus for Expensive Cars and Low Tax Revenues],
http://vz.ru/economy/2013/8/19/646277.html
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Table I: Negative Binomial Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Population*10000 0.03 0.05* 0.04*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Urban -0.11 -0.03 0.08
(0.22) (0.18) (0.18)
Elevation*1000 1.47*** -0.78+ -0.73+
(0.39) (0.41) (0.40)
Oil 2.19*** 0.68 0.80+
(0.49) (0.42) (0.42)
Forest 2.77*** 1.47* -0.28 -0.48 -0.18 -0.37
(0.70) (0.62) (0.92) (0.91) (0.89) (0.88)
Ethnicity 2.98*** 2.61*** 2.10*** 2.16*** 1.97*** 1.93***
(0.35) (0.34) (0.42) (0.43) (0.46) (0.46)
Forest x Ethnicity 3.45* 3.53* 5.07*** 5.46***
(1.51) (1.50) (1.47) (1.45)
Log-likelihood -594.50 -585.23 -585.77 -566.56 -563.47 -561.22 -558.90 -554.41 -551.42
Deviance 206.73 206.11 206.18 204.94 205.20 205.09 205.12 206.00 206.02
AIC 1197.01 1178.45 1177.55 1139.11 1134.94 1132.44 1131.80 1122.82 1120.84
BIC 1210.20 1191.64 1187.44 1149.01 1148.13 1148.94 1154.89 1145.91 1150.53
N=200, Standard errors in parentheses, Signicance codes: 0.0001 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `+'
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Table II. Bayesian Negative Binomial Model
2.5% Posterior Mean 97.5%
Population 0.0011 0.3701 0.7303
Urban -0.2268 0.1117 0.4600
Elevation -1.6222 -0.7075 0.2067
Oil -0.2323 0.6817 1.5288
Forest -1.8346 -0.0813 1.9831
Ethnicity 1.0820 1.9436 2.8407
Forest x Ethnicity 1.9933 5.6605 9.3080
N=200. 95% Credible Intervals.
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Figure I: The spatial distribution of indiscriminate violence, largest indigenous ethnicity and forested
terrain in the North Caucasus, 2000-2011.
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Figure II: The marginal eects of the proportion of the indigenous ethnic population (top) and the
proportion of forested terrain (bottom) on the expected count of indiscriminate violent actions.
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Figure III: Wireframe plot of the interaction between indigenous ethnic population and forested terrain
on indiscriminate violence (the vertical axis).
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Figure IV: Interactive Eect of Indigenous Ethnic Population and Forested Terrain on Indiscriminate
Violence for xed values of each predictor. The top gure shows how more forested terrain strengthens
the eect of indigenous ethnicity on indiscriminate violence. The bottom gure displays how more
indigenous ethnic homogeneity strengthens the eect of forested terrain on indiscriminate violence.
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Figure V: Contour Plot depicts the interaction of forested terrain and indigenous ethnic homogeneity.
Forested terrain enhances the eect of ethnic homogeneity on the count of indiscriminate violence
events.
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Figure VI: Density plots of posterior estimates from a Negative Binomial Bayesian model with a non
informative prior of  = 0. The plot depicts interactive eect of `Indigenous Ethnic Population' and
`Forested Terrain' on Indiscriminate Violence along with the constitutive terms of interaction.
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Figure VII: Interval Plots of the Posterior values from a Bayesian Negative Binomial model (with a
non informative prior of  = 0). The bottom row, labeled `Forest:Ethnicity', depicts the interactive
eect of `Indigenous Ethnic Population' and `Forested Terrain' on Indiscriminate Violence.
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